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Casenotes and Comments
VARSITY BLUES: STUDENT ATHLETE UNIONIZATION IS THE
WRONG WAY FORWARD TO REFORM COLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS
MICHAEL P. CIANFICHI*
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and American collegiate athletics model are under intense scrutiny, both in the court
of law and public opinion. While the end goals to reform the lackluster education standards and to cease the exploitation of student athletes are necessary and legitimate, the same cannot be said of the means by which some
groups and commentators seek to do so. For example, the recent decision
by a Regional Director (“RD”) of the National Labor Relations Board (“the
Board”) in the Northwestern University 1 (“NWU”) case finding scholarship
football student athletes to be “employees” within the meaning of Section
2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) violates established
precedent and inappropriately thrusts labor union norms into the realm of
higher education.2 Board precedent and statutory interpretation of the Act
demonstrate that student athletes on scholarship at a university are not—and
were never intended to be—employees of their university within the meaning of the Act. 3 On review, the Board should therefore reverse the RD’s
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Varsity Blues is a reference to the 2011 song by the artist known as Wale, in which he, as a
former student athlete, describes the problems he sees in the collegiate athletic model. WALE,
VARSITY BLUES (The Board Administration 2011).
1. Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), Case 13-RC-121359, at *2
(N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 [hereinafter NWU].
2. See infra Part II.A.2. One of thirty-two different regional directors first hears a petitioner’s case before it is appealed to the five-member Board panel.
3. See infra Part II.A. Note that the members of the Board are not Article III judges and are
thus not bound to the doctrine of stare decisis in the same way that Article III judges are. Interstate Tel. Co-op., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 518 N.W.2d 749, 752 (S.D. 1994) (citing Motor
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decision or, in the alternative, vacate the RD’s decision and decline jurisdiction.
By involving itself in this issue, the Board risks creating severe unintended consequences 4 and further complicating the matter due to its limited
jurisdiction. 5 Instead, this Comment recommends the NCAA should drive
efforts to remedy the exploitative collegiate athletics model and focus on
what is best for the student athlete in the long term—obtaining an education
and degree. 6 The NCAA, more than the Board or a state legislature, is best
positioned to enact equitable, uniform, and effective reforms. These reforms should include allowing student athletes to profit from the use of
their image and likeness,7 and reemphasizing the “student” in student athlete by ensuring that student athletes have the opportunity to succeed in the
classroom. 8
The NWU case places the fate of student athletes across the country at
a crossroads: the cold economics of an employment relationship in one direction and a warm and strong educational environment in the other. This
Comment strongly supports the latter, recognizing that universities are a
place where all those pursuing degrees are primarily students and must be
treated as such, with the goal of providing the knowledge and skills necessary for a successful career—not temporary employment. Although universities provide student athletes with full-ride scholarships, one must ask
whether these “free educations” are also free of educational value. Instead
of shortsightedly changing collegiate athletics to make student athletes athletic employees of their university, a renewed emphasis on education would
be the wiser reform, fulfilling the university mission of preparing its students for a long and prosperous career.
I. BACKGROUND
Since Congress passed the Act in 1935 as a remedy to industrial workplace tensions and inequalities, the Board has applied it to universities in
conflicting ways. Initially loath to find the Act applicable to an academic
setting, the Board later interpreted the definition of “employee” under Section 2(3) to preclude graduate assistants (“GAs”) and similar students who
received financial aid in return for duties from statutory coverage. 9 The
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)) (“Both federal and state courts have repeatedly noted, however, that administrative agencies are not bound
by stare decisis as it applies to previous agency decisions.”).
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See infra Part II.D.1.
8. See infra Part II.D.2.
9. E.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972) (finding graduate assistants were not university employees under the Act).
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Board departed from that precedent in New York University,10 where it used
the common law employee test to find that the Act did cover such students. 11 Shortly after, however, the Board overturned that decision in
Brown University 12 and returned to precedent finding that GAs were not
university employees under the Act. 13 Recently, scholarship football players at NWU awakened the debate over the employment status of students
receiving financial aid after a RD granted their petition to be labeled employees under the Act. 14
A. Congress Enacted the National Labor Relations Act to Cure
Industrial Workplace Strife
In 1935, Congress enacted the Act to encourage collective bargaining
as a means of addressing industrial strife and inequality in bargaining power
between private sector employees and employers, with the end goal of improving wages and working conditions. 15 Congress declared that the denial
of basic rights to organize, to collectively bargain, and to work under safe
conditions not only harmed the general welfare of employees but also of the
national economy as a whole.16 The Act established the right for workers to
self-organize and choose their own representative to negotiate their employment terms and conditions. 17 To further this objective, the Act created
the Board as the enforcing agency. 18
If workers wish to organize as a union with collective bargaining
rights, they must petition the Board to grant them those rights. As a prerequisite, the employer must be an “employer” as defined by the Act, and, as
follows, the employees must meet the Act’s definition of “employee.” 19
Section 2(3) of the Act reads “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . .” 20 and then lists employees exempted from statutory coverage. 21 With little guidance from the ambiguous statute as to what groups
10. N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
11. Id. at 1205.
12. Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
13. Id. at 483.
14. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 153.
19. Id. § 152(2)–(3). For the full statutory definition of § 152(3) (on employees) see infra
note 21.
20. Id. § 152(3).
21. Id. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employ-
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constitute statutory employees, the Board, as the delegated expert agency,
has been instrumental in forming the governing law.22
B. The Majority of Board Precedent Determined That Students
Working Part-Time for Their University Are Primarily Students,
Not Employees
This Section traces the Board’s involvement in decisions regarding
whether students providing part-time services to their university while also
receiving financial aid are employees under the Act. As the student-athleteemployee issue in NWU is one of first impression, analogous cases involve
GAs or medical interns.23 GAs, along with their related peers, like scholarship student athletes, are enrolled as degree-seeking students at a university
and are expected to partake in certain activities in order to receive their financial aid. 24 Therefore, an understanding of the treatment of GAs with respect to Section 2(3) of the Act provides important context for the student
athlete issue.
The majority of the Board’s cases on GA petitions exclude students
from statutory coverage on the basis that being “primarily a student” precluded them from being an “employee” under the Act. 25 The Board often
justifies these decisions by stating collective bargaining rights would infringe upon traditional academic freedoms and that students, as degreeseeking individuals, are at their respective university in an educational and
not an economic or employment relationship.26
1. 1970–1999: The First Phase of Board Cases Denied StudentPetitions for Employee Status
It was not until 1970 that the Board first recognized private nonprofit
universities as employers under the Act, giving it the prerequisite jurisdicer subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is
not an employer as herein defined.”).
22. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (“[T]he task of defining the term
‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act.’” (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944))).
23. Graduate Assistants, when used in this article, includes research assistants, teaching assistants, and fellows. For a full explanation of medical interns, see infra note 35.
24. Compare Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (noting that to maintain their financial aid, the GAs must: (1) be enrolled as degree-seeking students, (2) maintain a full-time student credit load, and (3) spend a mandatory amount of time in their duties), with NWU, Case 13RC-121359, at *9 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13RC-121359 (imposing the same three requirements on the student athletes).
25. E.g., Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004) (finding GAs are primarily students, not employees).
26. Id. at 490 (citing St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977))
(“[T]he Board concluded that collective bargaining would unduly infringe upon traditional academic freedoms.”).
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tion to rule on whether students were employees of their university. 27
Shortly after, the Board denied petitions from GAs at Adelphi University 28
and at Stanford University 29 by determining that the petitioners were primarily students and thus not employees under the Act.30 The Board in both
cases reasoned that the GAs were only at the university performing their
duties because of their enrollment in pursuing a degree. 31 The fact that the
GAs performed services (grading, teaching, or research) in order to receive
their financial aid packages did not make them employees under the Act. 32
To the contrary, in Stanford, the Board stressed the fact that the GAs received the same amount of financial aid regardless of their tasks, hours
worked, or work quality as supporting the conclusion that the purpose of
their duties was to further academic growth and was not employee-based. 33
The Board distinguished the Stanford GAs from the employee-designated
research associates, since the latter had already received their degree, were
no longer enrolled as students, and could be fired.34
Shortly after Stanford, the Board denied employee designation petitions from medical interns and residents in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 35
and St. Clare’s Hospital 36 on the basis that they were each primarily students and not employees under the Act. 37 The Board in Cedars-Sinai used
the justification from Stanford in reasoning that the fact that the financial
aid the petitioners received was not dependent on the nature, the quality, or
the amount of time spent on their work showed that no employment rela-

27. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970). The emphasis on private universities is
because the Act excludes federal or state institutions (e.g., public universities) from coverage. 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term “employer” . . . shall not include the United States . . . or any
State of political subdivision thereof . . . .”). Collective bargaining rights for public state employees are governed by their respective state’s labor laws. MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE STATES 3 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/statepublic-cb-2014-03.pdf.
28. Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 639.
29. The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
30. Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640; Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 623.
31. Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640.
32. Id.; Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622.
33. Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 621–22.
34. Id. at 623. In contrast, Stanford could not fire the GAs since they were students seeking a
degree; therefore even if they failed to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner, the only repercussion would be a non-passing grade. Id.
35. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). The term “intern” is specific to its
medical context: “An intern is a medical school graduate serving his first period of graduate medical training in a hospital. Most states, including California, require an internship of 1 year to qualify for the examination to practice medicine. A resident is a physician who has completed an internship and serves a period of more advanced training, lasting from 1 to 5 years, in a specialty.”
Id. at 251.
36. St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
37. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 251; St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003.
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tionship existed. 38 Although the petitioning students in Cedars-Sinai spent
more time on direct patient care duties than in a traditional classroom setting, the Board noted that these duties were required aspects of the studenttraining program, making them a necessary component of their education.39
The petitioning students therefore were at Cedars-Sinai as part of an educational—not employment—relationship. 40
In St. Clare’s, the Board explained why a student-employment relationship would be inappropriate for an educational setting. The Board emphasized that a student and university share a mutual interest in educational
development, a mutual relationship interest foreign to collective bargaining
and a true employment environment. 41 The process of collective bargaining, the Board explained, would harm the personal academic nature of the
student-university relationship. 42 The Board cautioned that, “From the
standpoint of national labor policy, subjecting academic decisionmaking to
collective bargaining is at best of dubious value because academic concerns
are largely irrelevant to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.” 43 The egalitarian goals of collective bargaining run contrary to the
hierarchical structure of higher education where professors and officials,
with their superior experience and knowledge, know what is best for a student’s academic growth. 44 Lastly, the Board stated that collective bargaining would impose on traditional values of academic freedom, like the rights
of faculty to determine course requirements (materials, length, GPA standards, and exam rules) and of school officials to determine academic progression and dismissal standards. 45
2. 1999–2000: The Board Briefly Diverged from Precedent and
Granted Employee Status to Student Petitioners
In deciding the current NWU student athlete case, the RD used the
common law master-servant test to find employee status under the Act. 46
The common law test is the only means by which the Board has found student petitioners to be employees within this issue; however, the Board has
only used this test in dissenting opinions and outlier cases. 47
38. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 252.
39. Id. at 253.
40. Id.
41. St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1003.
46. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
47. See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254 (1976) (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
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The first time the common law master-servant test appeared in a Board
decision concerning this issue was in a dissenting opinion by Member Fanning in Cedars-Sinai. 48 Fanning referred to the circular definition of Section 2(3) as indicative of Congressional intent to invoke the ordinary meaning of the term “employee,” that is, the common law “master-servant”
meaning. 49 Fanning quoted the common law definition of a servant as a
“person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other’s control or right of control.”50 Using this definition,
Fanning concluded that the interns and residents were employees. 51 Fanning similarly dissented in St. Clare’s. 52
The first time a majority of the Board accepted the common law test
and found petitioning students to be employees under the Act occurred in
Boston Medical Center. 53 There, the Board overturned the RD and concluded that although the petitioning medical interns and residents were
there to learn, they were also employees under the Act.54 The petitioning
students, like those in Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s, had graduated medical
school and were in the mandatory residency program to practice their desired medical specialty. 55 Similar to how GAs split time between the classroom and their duties, residency programs consist of both classroom lectures by faculty and clinical training with patients.56 Unlike the GAs,
however, the petitioners received compensation for their duties with salaries
and benefits akin to hospital employees. 57
The Board in Boston Medical used the common law master-servant
test to conclude that the petitioners were employees under Section 2(3).58

48. Id.
49. Id. Recall the circular 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term “employee” shall include any employee . . . .”).
50. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 254–55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2
(1957) (“A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform services in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control
by the master.”)).
51. Id.
52. St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1009 (1977) (Fanning, Chairman,
dissenting).
53. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
54. Id. at 168.
55. Id. at 153. The Board therefore purported to overrule Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s in this
decision. Id. at 152.
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 156.
58. Id. at 160. The Supreme Court, regarding the interpretation of “employee” under Section
2(3), stated: “‘In the past, when Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we
have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.’
At the same time, when reviewing
the Board’s interpretation of the term ‘employee’ as it is used in the Act, we have repeatedly said
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By citing to Member Fanning’s dissent in Cedars-Sinai, the Board argued
that when Congress uses “employee” as broadly as it did in Section 2(3),
the common law test for its plain meaning is appropriate. 59 The plain
meaning of “employee,” the Board stated, is any person who works for another, under their control, in return for compensation.60 Therefore, since the
petitioners worked for Boston Medical, under its control, and received
compensation, they were employees. 61 The Board distinguished the petitioners from traditional students by noting that they do not take classroom
exams or receive grades; instead, their entire educational experience at Boston Medical is to gain sufficient clinical experience and knowledge to become medical board-certified. 62
One year later, with Boston Medical as its support, the Board ruled that
GAs at New York University (“NYU”) were employees under the Act. 63
The Board, as it did in Boston Medical, stressed that being primarily a student does not preclude also being an employee under the Act.64 The Board
cited to Supreme Court precedent in broadly interpreting the term “employee” in Section 2(3). 65 By accepting the Supreme Court’s holding in SureTan, the Board opened statutory inclusion to anyone not explicitly listed in
the exceptions to Section 2(3). 66
Consistent with Boston Medical and Member Fanning’s dissents, the
Board employed the common law test to find that the GAs were employees. 67 The Board reasoned that since the GAs performed duties under

that ‘[s]ince the task of defining the term “employee” is one that “has been assigned primarily to
the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,” . . . the Board’s construction of that term is
entitled to considerable deference.’” NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94
(1995) (citations omitted).
59. Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 160.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 161.
63. N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1218 (2000).
64. Id. at 1206; Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 161.
65. N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S.
85, 91–92 (1995) (upholding the Board’s broad and literal interpretation of “employee” in Section
2(3) to include a worker who was also a paid union organizer); and Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (finding that only groups specifically exempted in Section 2(3) are excluded from coverage, therefore petitioning undocumented aliens are employees under the Act)).
But see Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (finding that petitioning ship masters, mates, and pilots, who were not specifically exempted in Section 2(3), were nevertheless not employees). In contrast with the student athlete issue,
there was no dispute in Town & Country or Sure-Tan on whether the petitioners were in an employment relationship with their employer.
66. N. Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205.
67. Id. at 1205–06 (citing Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 93–95 (holding that an individual is an employee under the common law master-servant test when there is a relationship in
which a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control, and in return for payment)).
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NYU’s supervision for pay (financial aid), they were in a master-servant relationship. 68 The Board dismissed NYU’s contention that allowing the GAs
to gain collective bargaining rights would infringe on academic freedoms,
since it was simply giving the parties an opportunity to negotiate.69 The
Board implied that there would be no negative effects from extending collective bargaining rights to students by stating that in the thirty years since
it first allowed faculty to form collective bargaining units, there had been no
adverse effects on academic freedoms. 70
3. 2004–Present: The Board Quickly Returned to Its Precedent and
Overruled NYU
Four years later, the Board explicitly overruled NYU in Brown University. In doing so, the Board returned to the twenty-five years of case law
preceding Boston Medical and found that GAs are primarily students in an
educational relationship with their universities and not statutory employees
in an economic relationship. 72 The Board considered four factors in finding
that the GAs were not employees: (1) the GAs’ status as students, (2) the
role of their GA duties in graduate education, (3) the GAs’ relationship with
the faculty, and (4) the financial aid the GAs received to attend Brown. 73
As to the first and second factors, unlike in NYU, the Board explained that
most departments at Brown required graduate students to be a GA to obtain
a degree. 74 Third, faculty played an integral role in the GAs’ educational
development. 75 Lastly, all GAs generally received equal financial aid regardless of the department, nature, quality, or amount of their work. 76
The Board conceded that Boston Medical claimed to overrule the decisions in St. Clare’s and Cedars-Sinai, but it distinguished Boston Medical
from its case at hand by the fact that the interns and residents in Boston
Medical—unlike the GAs at Brown—had already graduated medical school
71

68. Id. at 1206.
69. Id. at 1208. The Board stated that the long history of the Act demonstrates that collective
bargaining has been able to adjust to all sectors of the evolving economy. Id.
70. Id. (citing Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. at 164–65 (finding no evidence that collective
bargaining would make the employees demand concessions that would interfere with the employer’s educational mission)).
71. Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
72. Id. at 483, 489. This longstanding precedent, the Board noted, was never overturned in
court or Congress. Id. at 483.
73. Id. at 489.
74. Id. at 484–85, 488.
75. Id. at 489.
76. Id. at 484. The GA tasks varied widely by department and did not influence the stipend
amount. The fellows did not partake in “services” under faculty guidance to receive their stipend,
they simply completed a dissertation. Id.
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and were not degree-seeking students. 77 Indeed, enrollment as a degreeseeking Brown student was a prerequisite for the GAs’ financial aid consideration. 78
The Board justified its return to pre-NYU precedent by reviewing the
original intent of the Act and concluded that the fundamental premise of the
Act was to cover economic—not educational—relationships. 79 The Board
cited to Congress’s failure to enact legislation contrary to its pre-NYU precedent as evidence that Congress approved of GAs not being employees. 80
The Board thus analyzed Section 2(3) under the principle that “a reviewing
court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision
in isolation.” 81 With these principles in mind, the Board rejected jurisdiction over relationships that are primarily educational. 82 The Board also resuscitated the St. Clare’s concerns over the detrimental effects that collective bargaining would have in an educational environment.83
Brown, for the moment, resolved the issue that students performing
traditional academic duties, like those of a GA, in return for financial aid
packages are not employees of their university. 84 Another group of students
who perform duties in return for financial aid are student athletes. Individuals within this group, just as the GAs did before them, now seek the Board
to approve their petition granting them employee status under the Act. Distinct from the GA issue, however, disagreement exists regarding whether
the student athletes’ duties are similarly intertwined with academics or are
instead employment-based work.

77. Id. at 483 n.4, 487. Although the Board in Brown overruled NYU (which had relied on
Boston in support of its conclusion), the Board decided to “express no opinion regarding the
Board’s decision in Boston Medical Center,” likely because of how distinguishable the facts are
from this one (degree seeking students vs. graduated students). Id. at 483 n.4.
78. Id. at 488.
79. Id. at 487–89 (“[T]he mutual interests of the students and the educational institution . . .
are predominantly academic rather than economic in nature. Such interests are completely foreign
to the normal employment relationship and . . . are not readily adaptable to the collectivebargaining process.” (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
80. Id. at 493.
81. Id. at 488 n.23 (“The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
scheme.” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
82. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 490 (“These decisions would include broad academic issues involving class size,
time, length, and location, as well as issues over graduate assistants’ duties, hours, and stipends.
In addition, collective bargaining would intrude upon decisions over who, what, and where to
teach or research—the principal prerogatives of an educational institution like Brown.”).
84. Id. at 483.
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C. The Regional Director in NWU Found Scholarship Football
Student Athletes to be Employees under the Act
In March 2014, the RD ruled on a first of its kind petition from a group
of scholarship football student athletes (“SAs”) 85 at Northwestern University. 86 The SAs sought employee status under Section 2(3) of the Act for the
opportunity to vote on whether to unionize and obtain collective bargaining
rights. 87 The RD granted their petition, determining that the SAs were employees within the meaning of the Act and directed them to vote on unionization. 88 The Board granted review of the RD’s decision, halting the vote
results until final resolution. 89
1. Background to the Regional Director’s NWU Decision
NWU, like Brown, NYU, Adelphi, and Stanford, is a private nonprofit
university. 90 It has nineteen varsity sports teams that participate in Division
1 (“D1”) athletic competition in the Big-10 subdivision of the NCAA. 91
NWU recruits student athletes to its football team by offering financial aid
scholarships that cover tuition, fees, room, board, and books. 92 NWU gives
these scholarships, referred to as “grant-in-aid” financial aid packages, to 85
of the team’s 112 players, and each are valued at $61,000 per year. 93 Each
grant-in-aid recipient receives the same scholarship value, regardless of his
position, skillset, or playing time. 94 Unlike other universities that only provide yearly scholarships, NWU guarantees four-year scholarships. 95

85. Throughout this Comment, the term “SAs” refers uniquely to scholarship football players
at NWU whereas the broader term “student athletes” references that general category of student
athletes at all universities.
86. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletics Players Ass’n (Capa) Petitioner, at *1 (Apr. 24,
2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. The Board had not yet released its
appeals decision at the time this Comment went to publication.
90. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
91. Id. NWU has eight varsity sports teams for men and eleven for women. Of the universities 8,400 overall students, 500 participate on these 19 teams. Id.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. The only exception is that upperclassmen can elect to live off campus, in which case
they are provided an additional monthly stipend to cover their living expenses valued between
$1,200–$1,600. Id.
95. Id. at 3–4.
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The Regional Director Found the Student Athletes to be
Employees Under the Act Using the Common Law Test

The RD found that the SAs were employees under the Act by using the
common law master-servant test. 96 The RD asserted that since the SAs
provide a service to NWU, for which they receive payment (financial aid),
while subject to NWU’s control, they are employees. 97 As proof that the
SAs provide a service of value to NWU, the RD pointed to the fact that the
football program generated $235 million in revenue and prestige from
2003–2012. 98 Regarding compensation, the RD declared that the scholarships were compensation for the SAs’ athletic services. 99 The RD stated
that since the scholarship contracts do not permit the SAs to profit from
their athletic abilities, the SAs are dependent on the scholarships for basic
necessities. This crucial fact, the RD noted, transformed the scholarship
contracts into employment contracts, especially since the Head Coach can,
with the Athletic Director’s approval, cancel a scholarship with cause. 100
He also stated, without explanation, that since each SA receives the same
scholarship amount, the scholarship tender is an employment contract.101
Concluding the common law test, the RD determined that the SAs
were subject to extensive control by NWU in performance of their services. 102 There are numerous restrictions and responsibilities imposed on a
SA, some imposed by the NCAA and others imposed by NWU. 103 For ex-

96. Id. at 13 (“[A]n employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract
of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”).
97. Id. at 14. The RD maintained that walk-on (that is, non-scholarship) players were not
employees since they do not sign a scholarship tender, thus entering into an employment contract
with the university. Despite participating in the same activities as the scholarship players and being subject to the same rules, the RD distinguished that the walk-ons “have nothing tying them to
the football team except their ‘love of the game’ and the strong camaraderie that exists among the
players.” Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. The RD did not find the fact that the scholarships were not taxable relevant to the
inquiry. Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 15. Causes for cancelling an SA’s scholarship include if the SA:
(1) renders himself ineligible from intercollegiate competition; (2) engages in serious
misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary action; (3) engages in conduct resulting
in criminal charges; (4) abuses team rules as determined by the coach or athletic administration; (5) voluntarily withdraws from the sport at any time for any reason; (6) accepts compensation for participating in an athletic contest in his sport; or (7) agrees to
be represented by an agent.
Id. at 4. In the past five years, only two SA scholarships have been cancelled at NWU (shooting a
BB gun inside a university dormitory; repeated failure to comply with drug and alcohol policies).
Id.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 4–9. Many of these restrictive rules are NCAA policy that the university must enforce and abide by, but the RD maintained that, “The fact that some of these rules are . . . NCAA
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ample, SAs must maintain a minimum GPA, make adequate degree progress, and receive their head coach’s permission to live off campus. 104 Further, by accepting a scholarship, SAs relinquish the right to profit from their
name, image, or likeness while a student, and agree not to give interviews,
not to gamble on sports, and to submit to drug and alcohol tests, among
other rules. 105 The RD also cited the academic-based mandatory participation in study halls and career development programs as evidence of the university’s control over their lives. 106
The RD also referred to the strict schedules the SAs must adhere to
during training camp, while traveling to games, and on game days as further
proof of NWU’s extensive control over their lives. 107 For example, the time
commitment to football-related activities can fluctuate to as many as sixty
hours per week and averages twenty-eight hours per week over the year. 108
Next, the RD explained that Brown did not apply, because the SAs are
not primarily students, their football services are unrelated to educational
requirements, faculty does not supervise them, and they do not receive financial aid.109 The RD said the SAs are not primarily students since they
spend more time on football-related activities than they do on their studies. 110 This fact led to the RD’s second conclusion, that—unlike the GAs—
the SA services to the university are not a core element of their degree requirements. 111 In Brown, the GA duties garnered academic credit and were
a prerequisite to receiving a graduate degree, but here, the RD explained,
the SAs’ football services produce no academic credit and are not a degree
requirement. 112
rules does not detract from the amount of control the coaches exert over the players’ daily lives.”
Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 11, 16. The GPA minimum raises from 1.8 as a second year to 2.0 by their fourth
year. For regular (non-athlete) students to continue to receive their financial aid package, they
must have a 2.0 GPA by the end of their second year and thereafter. NORTHWESTERN
UNDERGRADUATE
CATALOG
2014–15,
at
15,
available
at
http://www.registrar.northwestern.edu/courses/archive/nucat_2014_15/201415_Undergraduate_Catalog.pdf.
105. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *5 (N.L.R.B Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. Other restrictions deserving mention are that the players must accept Facebook friend requests from their coach, attend study halls under certain conditions, wear team-issued outfits on game days, and live on campus during their first two years. Id.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id. at 15–16.
108. Id. at 5–9. Twenty-eight is the average based on testimony; there are times of the year
where it is much higher and much lower. Transcript of Record at 345, Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll.
Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA) (2014) (Case 13-RC-121359).
109. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *18–20 (N.L.R.B Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
110. Id. at 18. Compare with Brown, where the GAs spent only a limited time on their GA
duties and were primarily focused on obtaining their graduate degree. Id.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id.

596

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:583

The RD further distinguished Brown by noting that coaches, not faculty, supervise the SAs in their services. 113 Lastly, the RD distinguished financial aid (like in Brown, which did not always require services), from
scholarship compensation (like here, which does require ongoing athletic
services to continue to receive the scholarship). 114 The RD concluded his
findings by ordering the SAs to vote on whether to form a union. 115 On
April 24, 2014, the Board accepted the university’s petition to grant review,
to which twenty-four amicus briefs were filed. 116
II. ANALYSIS
The Board should reverse the RD’s decision that the SAs are employees under the Act because it departs from precedent and would adversely
affect education quality. In so ruling, the Board should hold that student
athletes are not employees under Section 2(3), or, in the alternative, vacate
the RD’s ruling and decline jurisdiction over the matter. Analogous Board
precedent shows that students like the SAs are not employees under the Act,
but are instead primarily students.117 What is more, collective bargaining
would infringe on academic freedoms to the detriment of the university’s
educational mission. 118 If affirmed, the RD’s decision would create negative unintended consequences, by creating separate classes of players and
students with different rights within the same university, and by creating
noncompliance with Title IX regulations—all while leading to a financially
ruinous slippery slope of potentially labeling numerous other groups of students “employees” with collective bargaining rights.119 For these reasons,
and because the Board has limited jurisdiction over private universities, the
Board should reverse the RD or decline jurisdiction so as to allow the
NCAA to unilaterally enact change. 120
By declining jurisdiction, the Board will avoid fractured reforms that
would upset competitive balance on the field and allow the NCAA to create
reform in two areas. 121 First, regarding licensing rights, the NCAA should
allow student athletes to profit from the use of their image and likeness as
prescribed in O’Bannon v. NCAA. 122 Second, the NCAA should reempha113. Id.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Id. at 23.
116. Nw. Univ. Emp’r & Coll. Athletics Players Ass’n (CAPA) Petitioner, Case 13-RC121359, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
117. See infra Part II.A.1.
118. See infra Part II.A.2.
119. See infra Part II.B.
120. See infra Part II.C.
121. See infra Part II.D.
122. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-17068
(9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014).
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size the “student” in student athlete by enacting rules that promote educational development in accordance with a university’s fundamental mission—to prepare the student for a successful career.
A. Governing Board Precedent Demonstrates That Student Athletes
Are Not—and Were Never Meant to be—Employees of Their
University
Board precedent on this issue reveals that degree-seeking students who
perform part-time duties for their university in order to receive financial aid
are not employees because they are primarily students. This precedent,
which the RD in NWU mistakenly failed to follow, is what Brown reasserted by overruling NYU and citing to Adelphi, Stanford, St. Clare’s, and Cedars-Sinai. 123
1.

The Brown Four-Factor Test Demonstrates That the NWU
Student Athletes Are Primarily Students

An analysis of the four factors from Brown reveals that the SAs are not
employees under the statutory test because (1) the SAs are primarily students, (2) the scholarships the SAs receive are financial aid and not compensation for services rendered, (3) the SAs’ participation in football has an
educational element, and (4) the SAs participate in football under faculty
supervision.
a. Student Athletes Are Primarily Students and Not Employees
of Their University
The SAs’ relationship with the university is primarily educational and
not economic because their status as student athletes is contingent on being
a degree-seeking student. Perhaps the best indication of the fact that student athletes are primarily there to obtain an education is that only 1.6% of
college football players go on to play professionally. 124 The statistics are
even lower for men’s and women’s basketball.125 This statistic demonstrates that students are in college to obtain a degree to use post-graduation,
and are thus primarily students. Since the SAs’ financial aid and eligibility
to compete depends entirely on their status as degree-seeking students, they
are primarily students. 126 If the SAs were just employees there to provide
123. Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487, 491 (2004).
124. NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF COMPETING IN ATHLETICS BEYOND
THE HIGH SCHOOL INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL (last updated Sept. 24, 2013), available at
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Probability-of-going-pro-methodology_Update2013.pdf.
125. Id. Men’s basketball is 1.2% while women’s basketball is 0.9%. Id.
126. See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (“The graduate assistants are graduate
students working toward their own advanced academic degrees, and their employment depends
entirely on their continued status as such.”).
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athletic services, then it would not matter how many (if any) credits they
took in furtherance of a degree.
The extent of NWU’s control over the SAs also indicates that they are
primarily students, not employees. The RD in NWU alleged that the university and coaches subject the SAs to an enormous amount of control, indicating an employment relationship.127 This characterization is misleading
because all college students are subject to special rules imposed by their
university. 128 Moreover, it is the NCAA, not NWU, that imposes many of
the rules cited by the RD. 129 The fact that the RD found the SAs to spend
more hours per week on football-related activities than traditional classroom academic activities is not dispositive of them being employees. 130 In
fact, of the four NWU football players who testified in the NWU case, only
one stated that he spent more time on football than on his studies.131 Nevertheless, in his decision, the RD chose to rely solely on that one player’s testimony in concluding that all SAs spent more time on football.132 Moreover, testimony revealed that many of the rules are just paper tigers that are
not actually enforced, which demonstrates that the extent of subjugation is
not as draconian as some commentators allege. 133
The manner in which the university treats the SAs also indicates that
they are primarily students. The SAs do not enjoy employee benefits like
vacation time, promotions, or benefit plans; instead, they are eligible for resources limited to students, like running for student government positions,
living in student housing, and accessing the student health center. 134 As
127. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *15–16 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
128. See, e.g., CONSOLIDATED USM AND UMD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, SECTION VI8.10A, UNIV. OF MD. (last updated May 2, 2013), http://www.president.umd.edu/policies/docs/VI810A.pdf (prohibiting smoking on campus at the University of Maryland, College Park); see also
AND
OTHER
DRUG
POLICIES,
AM.
UNIV.,
available
at
ALCOHOL
http://www.american.edu/ocl/dos/upload/Alcohol-and-Other-Drugs-Policies.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2014) (prohibiting alcohol consumption on campus regardless of age).
129. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 10.3 (regulating gambling), Art. 12.5.2 (mandating that
student athletes cannot profit of their image or likeness), Art. 14.5 (regulating transfer eligibility),
Art. 31.2.2 (regulating drug use and testing) (2009–2010). These regulations are imposed by the
NCAA, not NWU (the alleged employer).
130. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (“While the [petitioners]
spend[] a greater percentage of their time in direct patient care [instead of in the classroom], this is
simply the means by which the learning process is carried out.”). See infra Part II.D.2 for further
discussion of remedies to reform collegiate athletics.
131. Transcript of Record at 177, supra note 108 (testimony of former NWU SA Theodis Colter).
132. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *18.
133. Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1309–10 (testimony of former NWU SA Patrick
Ward discussing that cell phone prohibitions on bus were not enforced, nor was the lights out rule
in hotels when traveling).
134. See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (holding that GAs were primarily students because they were ineligible for promotion, faculty tenure, or employee fringe benefits but

2015]

VARSITY BLUES

599

former SA John Pace testified in NWU, “we had a plaque in the team meeting room with our team goals. And the number one goal is to earn a
Northwestern degree.” 135
b. The Student Athletes Receive Financial Aid to Attend NWU
That SAs receive financial aid packages—not compensation for services rendered—is further proof that they are primarily students and not
employees. Each SA receives the same value financial aid package, regardless of his team position, productivity, starter status, football skills, seniority, or the amount of time he devotes to the team. 136 Since the amount of financial aid the SAs receive is unrelated to the nature, duration, or quality of
their work, it is unlike compensation for services in a true employment relationship and thus is financial aid. 137 The value of a SA’s scholarship is
fixed to the value of tuition, not his economic value as an employee. 138 The
Board in Brown resolved this issue in finding that the GAs received financial aid and not “consideration for work,” since all GAs received the same
amount despite disparate obligations. 139 Contrary to what pro-employee
critics argue, the scholarship’s condition on athletic participation does not
make it compensation. Nearly all university scholarships are conditional on
participation in an activity, academic performance, or remaining in good
standing, and those scholarship recipients are not alleged to be employees. 140
c.

The Student Athletes’ Participation in Football Has an
Educational Element

The third element from Brown assessed the relationship between the
students’ duties and their education. The RD overlooked the important edwere eligible for student government positions); see also The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214
N.L.R.B. 621, 622 (1974) (holding that GAs were primarily students because they did not get employee benefits but instead could access student health center and live in student dorms).
135. Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1278.
136. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3. Nor are their scholarships treated as taxable income as
compensation is. Id.
137. See Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622 (finding that since there was no correlation between
the work done and the amount received, the GAs were primarily students and not employees); see
also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 252 (1976) (finding that since “[t]he amount of
the stipend is not determined by the nature of the services rendered or by the number of hours
spent in patient care,” the GAs were primarily students and not employees).
138. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3.
139. Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488 (2004) (“We also emphasize that the
money received by the [GAs] is the same as that received by fellows [who provide no services in
return for their financial aid]. Thus, the money is not ‘consideration for work.’ It is financial aid
to a student.”).
MORE
COLLEGE,
140. See,
e.g.,
General
Scholarships,
THOMAS
http://www.thomasmore.edu/financial_aid/scholarships_freshman.cfm (last visited Dec. 16, 2014)
(receiving a band scholarship is conditioned on actively participating in marching band).
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ucational value of participating in collegiate athletics, which makes SAs
primarily students. The current U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan,
a former student athlete himself, recognized the educational value of collegiate athletics when he stated, “Student athletes learn lessons on courts and
playing fields that are difficult to pick up in chemistry lab. Resilience in the
face of adversity, selflessness, teamwork, and finding your passion are all
values that sports can uniquely transmit.” 141 Supreme Court Justice Byron
White, also a former student athlete, likewise stated, “Sports and other
forms of vigorous physical activity provide educational experience which
cannot be duplicated in the classroom.” 142 Courts and scholarly commentators agree with Secretary Duncan and Justice White in recognizing the
strong educational value of participating in collegiate athletics. 143 Some
commentators may swiftly dismiss this assertion, but in doing so they overlook the premise that underlies the important value of experiential out-ofclass learning. 144 Former NWU quarterback Theodis Colter, testifying in
favor of unionization in the NWU case, alluded to the educational nature of
sports and stated that football is more than just physical and is like “learning a new subject” and “a lot more mental than what people think.” 145
d. The Student Athletes Participate in Football Under Faculty
Supervision
The remaining factor from Brown emphasized faculty and academic
involvement in the GAs’ duties, an involvement that is also present in the
case of the SAs at NWU. On the record in NWU, former NWU SAs Douglas Bartels and Patrick Ward each testified that Head Coach Fitzgerald was
equivalent to their other teachers at NWU in teaching life and academic
skills. 146 The athletic department at NWU also provides the SAs an aca141. Arne Duncan, Let’s Clean up College Basketball and Football, HOME ROOM: THE
OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 2010), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2010/01/letsclean-up-college-basketball-and-football/.
142. Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 112 (2008).
143. See Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of California at Davis, 816 F. Supp. 2d 869,
874 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“The opportunity for students to participate in intercollegiate athletics is a
vital component of educational development.”); see also, Steve Chen et al., The Effect of Sport
Participation on Student-Athletes’ and Non Athlete Students’ Social Life and Identity, 3 J. ISSUES
IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 176, 176 (2010) (“Physical educators and sports experts would
agree that athletic participation brings numerous physiological, psychological, educational, and
social benefits to the participants.”).
144. See generally David A. Kolb, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE
OF LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (2014).
145. Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 106 –07.
146. Id. at 1233, 1310, 1311 (“Q: Would you characterize Coach Fitzgerald or your other
coaches as being among your teachers at Northwestern University? A: Most definitely, yeah. Q:
[W]ould you say that you learned any lessons through the football program that helped you in
your studies or helped you prepare for medical schools? A: Definitely [then discusses acquired
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demic advisor to ensure their academic progress, further evincing the faculty involvement in their football life.147 Some commentators might assert a
false dichotomy where Coach Fitzgerald can be either a faculty professor or
a boss, and since he is not the former, he must be the latter. Reality, however, requires a more nuanced assessment. Although Coach Fitzgerald’s
supervision of the SAs’ football activities is not as traditionally facultyoriented as the relationship in Brown, it nevertheless provides an element of
faculty supervision distinct from that of an employment relationship, since
Coach Fitzgerald is not an adversarial boss, but an invested mentor.
The SAs satisfy the four-factor test from Brown because they are primarily students, who do not receive compensation for services rendered,
who participate in an activity with an educational element, and who do so
under faculty supervision.
2. Collective Bargaining Would Infringe on Areas of Traditional
Academic Freedoms
As discussed in the Board’s jurisprudence on this issue in decisions
like Brown and St. Clare’s, collective bargaining is not appropriate for the
academic nature of a student’s education. 148 The personal relationship that
a student has with his university is one with the mutual interest of educational success, foreign to that of a labor-employment relationship where
conflicting economic interests exist.149 In a Supreme Court case involving
the Board, the Court correctly discerned that “principles developed for use
in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the academic
world.’” 150 As discussed above, Congress enacted the Act to cure industrial
workplace tension and it is inappropriate in an educational environment. 151
Higher education is set up to be hierarchical, where learned professors and
officials, with their superior knowledge and experience, decide what is best

skills such as time management, respecting other’s views, and working under pressure]”). Id. at
1233–34.
147. Id. at 1300.
148. Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 (2004) (noting that the concerns
raised in St. Clare’s twenty-five years prior about the “deleterious impact” of collective bargaining on education were still just as relevant).
149. See St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977) (“In our view this
is a very fundamental distinction for it means that the mutual interests of the students and the educational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly academic rather than economic in nature. Such interests are completely foreign to the normal employment relationship
and, in our judgment, are not readily adaptable to the collective-bargaining process.”).
150. N.L.R.B. v Yeshiva Univ., 444 US 671, 680–81 (1980) (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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for the students’ educational development.152 This system directly conflicts
with the equity-driven goals of collective bargaining. 153
Collective bargaining would impair education quality by intruding upon decisions reserved for professional university officials. Union representatives should not be able to interfere with or influence how a university
or its professors facilitate the higher learning process. The Supreme Court
has recognized a university’s fundamental right to “determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.” 154 Essential university decisions upon which collective bargaining could infringe are numerous, including: GPA eligible minimums; grading standards; course content, length,
and materials; attendance policies; graduation requirements; and dismissal
standards. 155 The rejection of union representatives as a mediator between
the SAs and the university is not a rejection of student input in university
affairs. Students naturally deserve a voice in university operations, but
those channels already exist in the likes of student government councils,
where all students have a voice in their education. It would certainly be adverse to a meritocratic learning environment if a regular student sitting next
to a student athlete in lecture were governed by different grading, attendance, GPA, or credit hour standards. Notwithstanding the extent to which
this double standard may already exist in some universities, codifying it is
not a proper solution. 156
Further, if permitted, collective bargaining would lead to an endless
list of bargaining activities. Athletics-related areas on this list include drug
testing policies, punishments for breaking rules (such as underage drinking
or missing practice), practice lengths, the ability to strike, or playing time.
Not only would this create inherent unfairness among the non-scholarship
players and regular students (who are devolved into a separate class of
standards), but this would also create unfairness for opposing teams and it
would usurp the NCAA’s role as the governing body to ensure uniformi-

152. St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002.
153. See id. (“In addition to being ‘collective,’ the bargaining process is also designed to
promote equality of bargaining power, another concept largely foreign to higher education.”).
154. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)) (discussing how
the First Amendment has a special concern for a university’s freedom to make its own educational
judgments).
155. See St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003 (“Such freedoms [that could be infringed upon]
encompass . . . such fundamental matters as the right to determine course length and content; to
establish standards for advancement and graduation . . . .”).
156. David Whitley, NCAA Shows Double Standard in Treatment of North Carolina BasketNEWS
(Sept.
27,
2012),
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaaball,
SPORTING
basketball/story/2012-09-24/north-carolina-academic-scandal-roy-williams-uconn (discussing the
double standard in the “classic Keep-Jocks-Eligible Sham” that allowed football and basketball
athletes to take sham courses without any disciplinary reaction).
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ty. 157 This type of collective bargaining would also infringe on the coaching staff’s ability to use their collective superior experience and knowledge
to create a positive football experience.
Therefore, labeling SAs as employees with collective bargaining rights
would be detrimental to the educational process in that it would remove
power from the traditional and superior decision-making authorities and
transfer it to labor union representatives who are concerned about economics, not educational development. What is more, it could lead to unfair outcomes where SAs are subject to different de jure academic standards than
those of regular students. Allowing SAs to collectively bargain would lead
to the further degradation of their role as students and push them towards
being purely economic employees, ultimately harming their learning process, degree, and career.
For the above reasons, the RD’s analysis is unsound and the Board
should reverse it and hold that the SAs are primarily students and not employees. In relying on the common law test, he deviated from Board precedent clearly articulated in the Brown four-factor test for statutory analysis of
Section 2(3). A proper statutory analysis, as discussed above, demonstrates
that the SAs are primarily students and that the educational environment for
degree-seeking students is not appropriate for economic and employment
policies accompanying collective bargaining. 158 Despite the RD’s insistence that the common law test determines the SAs to be employees, state
courts employing a codified version of the common law for worker’s compensation claims have rejected this conclusion. 159 Courts resolving similar
issues concerning fair labor and employment suits have likewise rejected
student athletes being university employees. 160 What is more, respondeat
157. For more discussion of infringement of collective bargaining on uniformity and fair play,
see Part II.C.
158. Nor should the RD have relied on the findings in the overturned Boston Medical decision,
as that case is easily distinguishable from the SAs at NWU. See Brown Univ. & Int’l Union, 342
N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004) (“Although the Board later overruled St. Clare’s Hospital and CedarsSinai in Boston Medical Center, and asserted jurisdiction over the individuals there, those individuals were interns, residents, and fellows who had already completed and received their academic
degrees. The Board in Boston Medical did not address the status of graduate assistants who have
not received their academic degrees. In the instant case, the graduate assistants are seeking their
academic degrees and, thus, are clearly students.” (emphasis added)).
159. E.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288, 289–90 (Colo. 1957) (en
banc) (denying worker’s compensation funds to a student athlete who was injured during athletic
activities at his university because he was not an employee); Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (same); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d
224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692, 702,
707 (Tex. App. 2000) (same).
160. E.g., Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1981) (comparing
residence hall assistants to student athletes in concluding they are not employees of the university
under federal Fair Labor and Standards Act); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc.,
15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 759 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“No federal court has defied common sense by
holding student athletes to be Title VII [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] employees of their schools
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superior tort claims against universities alleging liability for the actions of
scholarship student athletes as “employees” have also failed.161
B. Adverse Unintended Consequences Would Result from Affirming
the Regional Director’s Decision
If scholarship football players were employees of their university, severe unintended consequences would ensue, demonstrating how the undeveloped, rash, and imprudent nature of this course of action would result in
unfairness, infeasibility, and potential illegality. These adverse consequences include the creation of two separate classes of players within the
same team, the creation of a slippery slope for allowing nearly any group of
students to become employees, and the potential for Title IX noncompliance.
1. The Regional Director’s Decision Draws Arbitrary Lines and
Creates a Slippery Slope for Designating Numerous Students as
Employees
In NWU, the fact that the SAs receive a scholarship as “compensation”
for their services was crucial to satisfying the common law test.162 This
finding, however, exposes the inherent unfairness in this decision—that the
non-scholarship “walk-ons” cannot be eligible as employees since they receive no compensation. The walk-on players do the same activities, for the
same duration, under the same rules as the scholarship players, yet the RD’s
ruling would relegate them to second-class status. 163 The RD tried to remedy a situation in which a group had no voice, but he exacerbated the problem. An inadvisable reaction would be to label walk-ons as employees,
despite their lack of compensation, bringing apparent fairness to the equation. However, this position wanders further down the path of unintended
consequences that fatally flaw the decision to include SAs as employees. If
the walk-ons—who receive no compensation and participate voluntarily in
a profitable activity—could be employees of the university, then many oth-

or an athletic association.”); Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 201 Cal. App. 4th 837 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (denying a race discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing
Authority Act because the student athlete was not an employee of the university).
161. E.g., Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 795 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Mass. 2003)
(finding that a Boston University scholarship basketball player who punched an opponent was not
an employee of the university for vicarious liability purposes); Korellas v. Ohio State Univ., 779
N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ohio Misc. 2d 2002) (finding that an Ohio State University scholarship
football player who punched a deliveryman was not an employee of the university).
162. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *14 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359.
163. Transcript of Record, supra note 108, at 1269, 1270 (testimony of former NWU SA John
Pace discussing how although his status changed from a walk-on to a scholarship player, he was
subject to the same rules, practice schedules, standards and expectations during each phase).
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er eligible students appear as potential employees. Many university students can fit into the RD’s common law category of employees, such as
non-football student athletes, members of the band or debate team, and
cheerleaders, raising the question of where this slippery slope drops off.
Many of these students receive a scholarship in return for dedicating a substantial amount of time to particular activities that can generate revenue.
Should these students thus become employees?
The inherent unfairness in excluding the above students or walk-ons
becomes even clearer with respect to non-football student athletes. Many
universities have other revenue generating sports (assuming that is the test,
as the RD curiously seemed to suggest). 164 Moreover, all scholarship student athletes could be employees under the common law test, since they all
receive compensation for services and are all subject to NCAA and university rules. The RD offers no guidance regarding where the line is drawn, if
one even exists. This runaway problem should be nipped in the bud by precluding all student athletes from becoming employees.
Allowing all scholarship student athletes (or walk-ons too) to be employees would also be devastating to the educational environment. Disconcertingly, it would create two de jure classes of students—employee students and normal students. What is more, the total amount of benefits,
including potential wages, that could be bargained for by so many student
athletes would quickly bankrupt a university or force it to abandon academic priorities to stabilize its athletic department’s bloating budget. In fact,
last year, only 23 of the 1,200 NCAA member universities 165 generated a
profit within their athletic department. 166 Indeed, universities are not overflowing with cash from college sports, and the average college loses four
million dollars per year on athletics. 167 This model would be unsustainable
164. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *14 (emphasizing that the SAs provide a service of value
that generates revenue as an important factor in the common law master-servant test). For example, the University of Denver men’s lacrosse team generated a profit last year. Is it fair to not let
them become employees, since they meet the RD’s common law test? Is that fair to other NCAA
lacrosse teams? See Eben Noby-Williams, Notre Dame Brings Lacrosse’s Lowest Revenue into
NEWS
(May
24,
2014),
NCAA
Semifinals,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-23/notre-dame-brings-lacrosse-s-lowestrevenue-into-ncaa-semifinals.
165. NCAA
Members
by
Division,
NCAA,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/divisionListing (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
166. Louanna Simon & Nathan Hatch, Why Unionizing College Sports is a Bad Call, WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
7,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441304579480013097853156.
167. See David Biderman, One Bowl Game Buys Many Lacrosse Sticks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23,
2009),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704224004574489281301154084?mg=ren
o64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052748704224004574489
281301154084.html (“If you take the median profits of every sport the NCAA documented, the
typical athletic program lost almost $4 million [in 2009].”).
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and have terribly adverse effects on the academic priorities of a university.
An attempt to make all student athletes employees could lead to the financial collapse of collegiate athletics.
2.

The Regional Director’s Decision Could Create Illegal
Noncompliance with Title IX Regulations

The statute commonly referred to as Title IX 168 mandates equal treatment of both sexes in educational institutions, and with respect to collegiate athletics, requires delineated equal expenditures and opportunities on
factors such as equipment, travel per diems, medical services, and housing
facilities. 169 Labeling student athletes on a men’s team as employees without doing so for a women’s team could lead to Title IX violations.170 In addition, a unionized football team could eventually bargain for so many benefits that the result would be only two male sports teams (football and
basketball) and enough women’s sports teams necessary to maintain Title
IX compliance, eliminating all other male sports teams. 171 Raising benefits
for all men and women’s teams altogether, although ensuring aggregate
equality, would also lead to runaway financial budgets.
C. If the Board Does Not Reverse the Regional Director, It Should
Alternatively Decline Jurisdiction over the Issue and Allow the
NCAA to Resolve It
Collective bargaining and its adversarial union process is not the proper vehicle in which to reform collegiate athletics—the NCAA is. 172 The
Act allows the Board to exercise discretion and decline jurisdiction over
matters where the labor dispute’s effect on commerce is not substantial
enough to warrant jurisdiction. 173 This issue requires such discretion for

168. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
169. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.41(c)(1)–(10) (2008).
170. For example, if the SAs at NWU bargained for particular terms and conditions such as
increased travel per diems, newer equipment, or expanded medical coverage, then the university
would have to decrease its spending on other male sports to maintain equal aggregate expenditures
with women’s sports to avoid violating Title IX.
171. See Kristin Rozum, Staying Inbounds: Reforming Title IX in Collegiate Athletics, 18 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 155, 156 (2003) (“The most significant unintended consequence [of Title IX] has
been the creation of a quota system, which has caused male sports to be eliminated from collegiate
athletic programs.”); see also Michael Rosen, Constitutional Implications of Title IX Compliance
in Colleges and Universities, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 503, 504 (2012) (discussing how Title
IX compliance disproportionately eliminated men’s sports at James Madison University).
172. See infra Part II.D.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (“The Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . .”); see also New York Racing Ass’n Inc. v. NLRB, 708
F.2d 46, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming the Board’s decision to decline jurisdiction over horse

2015]

VARSITY BLUES

607

two reasons: first, the Board does not wield enough legal influence to truly
remedy this issue, and second, trying to do so would only further complicate the matter.
1. The Board Does Not Wield Enough Influence to Successfully
Remedy This Issue
The Board only retains jurisdiction over private universities, which
comprise 17 of the 125 total D1 Football Bowl Subdivision 174 (“FBS”) universities. 175 Even if the Board were to label all football student athletes as
employees with collective bargaining rights, seventy-six percent of teams
would remain unaffected. The Board would benefit from exercising the
cardinal maxim of judicial restraint that “if it is not necessary to decide
more, it is necessary not to decide more.”176 Given the Board’s limited
scope of authority, the NCAA is more able to achieve comprehensive reform.
There is strong evidence that the NCAA and its member universities
are the most effective bodies to enact reform. Recently, each Pacific-12 and
Big-10 conference university president agreed to guarantee four-year scholarships to all student athletes, to allow former student athletes to return and
finish their degrees later in life, to improve medical coverage, and to increase the value of scholarships.177 If the Board had mandated any of these
changes, only three of those twenty-six universities would have been
bound. 178 Similarly, the NCAA itself recently modified its rules to guarantee unlimited meals and snacks to all student athletes instead of only three
meals per day, demonstrating its willingness for unilateral reform. 179 By
punting on this issue, the Board will appropriately heed to the bodies that
can actually effect broad change on the issue.

racing despite that the racing activities “affect interstate commerce and generate hundreds of millions of dollars in gross income.”).
174. FBS universities make up the top level division of NCAA college football.
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (federal and state entities are not subject to the Board’s
jurisdiction). Courts have also found religious schools exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction.
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1979); Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB,
558 F.3d 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
176. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
177. Ben Strauss, Big Ten Joins Pac-12 in Pressing the N.C.A.A. to Make Changes, N. Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/sports/ncaafootball/big-ten-joinspacific-12-in-pressing-ncaa-for-changes.html?_r=2.
178. The only private universities in those conferences are Northwestern University, University of Southern California, and Stanford University. See PAC-12 Conference, www.pac-12.com
(last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Big-10 Conference, www.bigten.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
179. Michelle Hosick, Council approves meals, other student-athlete well-being rules, NCAA
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/council-approves-mealsother-student-athlete-well-being-rules.
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2. Any Change the Board Can Create Would Further Complicate
the Issue and Disrupt Competitive Balance Within Athletic
Competition
The Board should decline jurisdiction over this issue because, as it
cannot bind public universities to its decisions, any Board rulings will have
the effect of creating a multi-tiered system where not all universities are
subject to the same rules. The situation would create an unfair disparity between the rules by which opposing teams abided, breaking the fundamental
NCAA tenet of competitive balance.180 If private university football players could bargain with their universities for different standards, rights, and
rules, but their opponents from a public university could not, the former
would gain an unfair advantage.
a.

Maintaining Competitive Balance Is Fundamental to
Collegiate Athletics

Ensuring uniform rules and compliance is fundamental to the popularity and legitimacy of collegiate athletics. Fans are drawn to college football
because of the parity, but this equilibrium would be destroyed if the Board
allowed some teams to be subject to different rules than the other.181 The
Supreme Court has recognized that “most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest
in intercollegiate athletics.” 182 Fair competition is stifled if certain unionized teams can write their own rules to which other teams are not subject.
Collective bargaining is appropriate for traditional labor competition but is
unsuitable for collegiate athletics where every team is supposed to operate
under uniform rules.
The possibility of unfair circumstances arising is easy to foresee. Perhaps private university players bargain with their university to reduce the
number of credit hours needed for eligibility, giving them more free time
than their public university opponents to train and prepare for games. Perhaps they bargain for more free tickets, wages, or a lower minimum GPA
standard, unfairly enticing top recruits to their school to the disadvantage of
a public university that is tied to its state’s labor laws. Moreover, if private
university players unionize and go on strike until the university pays them
180. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 2.10 (2009–2010).
181. See Jeffrey P. Gleason, From Russia with Love: The Legal Repercussions of the Recruitment and Contracting of Foreign Players in the National Hockey League, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 599,
617 (2008) (“[T]he establishment of a uniform set of rules and policies promotes parity among
teams and thereby creates a better product for sports fans . . . .”).
182. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (discussing television rights regulations); see also Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672
(7th Cir. 1992) (“All agree that cooperation off the field is essential to produce intense rivalry on
it—rivalry that is essential to the sport’s attractiveness . . . .”).
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wages as employees, the university would be confronted with a Hobson’s
choice. If the university acted and gave into the union demands, they would
face sanctions for breaching NCAA policies on amateurism, but if the university took no action and refused to negotiate, they would face Board sanctions for unfair labor practices. These examples show that the NCAA, with
its comprehensive control, is the appropriate body for reform—not the
Board.
b.

Many States Prohibit Public Employees from Collective
Bargaining

Many state legislatures prohibit public employees from collective bargaining. This fact demonstrates that even if all fifty states were to recognize student athletes as employees, many student athletes would still be unable to collectively bargain, putting them at an unfair disadvantage to those
who can. This fact underscores how the NCAA would be the ideal body to
enact reform since it can enforce change binding on all D1 FBS universities. State legislatures are limited to controlling labor practices only for
public employees within their own state—a problem similar to why the
Board is unfit to address this issue. Ohio and Michigan, in response to the
NWU decision, preempted the final Board decision and passed legislation
specifying that student athletes at state universities are not employees under
state law. 183 Many other states prohibit state employees from collective
bargaining and unionization. 184 The Board has no power to tell state legislatures which public employees can collectively bargain, meaning that its
decision could create an unwieldy situation wherein student athletes are
thrust into the disarray of state labor laws as employees.
In contrast to Ohio and Michigan, the Connecticut State Legislature
proposed a bill in January 2015 that would designate revenue-generating
student athletes at public universities as employees with collectively bargaining rights. 185 Aside from the reasons set forth in Part II.B against this
type of fragmented and unfair reform, this bill perturbingly codifies a revenue-generating quota requirement for purposes of employment determination.

183. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.56 (2014), available at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/3345
(effective Sept. 15, 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.201 (2014), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/publicact/pdf/2014-PA-0414.pdf (effective
Dec. 30, 2014).
184. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 95-98 (Lexis 2013) (state public employees cannot collectively bargain); Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-57.2 (Lexis 2013) (same); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann § 617.002
(West 2011) (same).
185. H.B. 5485, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015). The bill would only allow employee status to student athletes who receive a scholarship that covers at least 90% of tuition and is materially related
to the student’s participation in collegiate sports, and if the revenue generated by the student’s
sport exceeds 400% of the student’s scholarship value. Id.
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The RD’s efforts, although perhaps noble, would simply create chaos.
If, however, the NCAA unilaterally enacted change and the Board declined
jurisdiction over the employee issue, no university would face the dilemma
of possible sanctions for violating NCAA policy or breaching state labor
laws. Intercollegiate athletics requires all teams to operate under uniform
terms and conditions to maintain a competitive balance, and neither the
Board nor state legislatures can achieve this result because of their limited
authority. The Board should decline jurisdiction because, as Justice Brennan once stated, “the Board has recognized that principles developed for use
in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the academic
world.’” 186
D. Proposed Remedies for Reforming Collegiate Athletics
Given the imprudence of any Board involvement, there is little question that the NCAA is the best candidate to reform collegiate athletics and
tackle this issue. Although instances of universities exploiting student athletes and providing sham educations are unacceptable, as the RD failed to
see in NWU, one must remember that the shortest line to a more desirable
outcome is not necessarily the most legitimate or effective means of achieving that outcome. For an issue as large and complex as reforming collegiate
athletics, a more thoughtful, deliberate, and comprehensive plan is needed—not a knee-jerk reaction that will cause more harm than good. In its
core values, the NCAA purports to strive for “excellence in both academics
and athletics” and commitment to the “supporting role that intercollegiate
athletics plays in the higher education mission.”187 The game plan is sound,
now the NCAA must execute it.
Colleges Exploit Student Athletes, run the sad-but-true headlines. 188
The main contentions are: (1) colleges coerce student athletes into waiving
their rights to profit from their own image, and (2) colleges fail to provide
student athletes with a true higher education. In some cases, these allegations are disturbingly true. Indeed, to comply with NCAA rules, universities force recruits to sign away the right to profit from their name, image, or
likeness while enrolled at the university in order to receive their scholarship. 189 Further, recent reports about the University of North Carolina
186. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681 (1980) (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204
N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)).
187. NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values (last visited
Nov. 19, 2014).
188. E.g., Ellen Staurowsky, How Colleges Exploit Student-Athletes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14,
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/09/how-colleges-exploit-studentathletes/244945/; Sally Kohn, How college sports cheat student athletes, CNN (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/opinion/kohn-college-sports-cheat-student-athletes/.
189. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 1417068 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014).
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(“UNC”) failing to truly educate its student athletes reveal that an insufficient emphasis on education is becoming all too common. 190
The plan for reform should: (1) allow student athletes the right to profit from their own likeness, and (2) reemphasize the academic purpose of being a student athlete. The NCAA and universities can bolster the assertion
that student athletes are primarily students in several important ways. The
NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the hours student athletes devote to their sport, guarantee scholarships until graduation, improve medical
care coverage for injured players, improve academic support programs and
standards, and reform admissions standards to ensure that student athletes
are being properly educated at the right place.
1. Student Athletes Deserve the Right to Profit from Their Name,
Image, or Likeness
The federal district court ruling in O’Bannon v. NCAA presents a fair
remedy to the issue of unfair profiteering by universities. 191 O’Bannon is a
class action lawsuit on behalf of former D1 and FBS college men’s basketball and football players against the NCAA. 192 The court ruled for the
plaintiffs, finding that the NCAA and universities unlawfully restrained
trade in violation of antitrust laws in fixing the amount of compensation
student athletes can receive at the value of a grant-in-aid scholarship. 193
This restrictive rule forced recruits to waive their likeness rights to get a
scholarship, thus barring compensation from exceeding that of a grant-inaid scholarship. 194
The court prescribed two remedies for the antitrust violation that, if
upheld on appeal, will properly reform collegiate athletics. First, it enjoined the NCAA from enforcing its rule that prohibited universities from
offering recruits shares of licensing revenue in excess of the value of a
grant-in-aid scholarship. 195 Ideally, the procompetitive effect of this reme-

190. Philip Victor, UNC Scandal Illuminates Collegiate Fumbles on Student-Athlete Education, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 23, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/23/uncscandal-athletes.html.
191. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955. Oral arguments for the appeals case are scheduled for
March 17, 2015. Oral Argument Dates & Locations, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/calendar/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
192. Id. at 965.
193. Id. at 988. A full grant-in-aid scholarship includes tuition, fees, books, room, and board.
Id. at 965.
194. Id. at 988.
195. Id. at 1007–08. Since the court enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting universities from
offering recruits licensing revenue shares, this simply means that universities are not compelled to
do anything at all. Although the NCAA can cap the excess amount that universities offer, that cap
cannot be below the cost-of-attendance, which is typically a few thousand dollars higher than the
grant-in-aid bar and covers other school-related expenses like school supplies and transportation.
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dy would increase the overall value of scholarships, because as one university increases scholarship values, other universities will follow suit in order
to remain competitive contenders for top recruits.196
The court’s second remedy enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting universities from establishing trust funds containing a share of licensing revenue for the use of a student athlete’s name, image, or likeness, payable once
the student athlete leaves the university. 197 The trust fund would compensate the student athlete for the university’s profits off their likeness in television game broadcasts and merchandise sales. 198 The trusts must be for a
minimum of $5,000 per year of each student athlete’s eligibility. 199 To preserve amateurism, the NCAA can still prohibit the student athlete from using those trust funds while in school. 200
The court, citing the need for the NCAA to protect its student athletes
from commercial exploitation, denied the plaintiff’s proposed remedy of allowing them to receive money for endorsements while students.201 NCAA
bylaws prohibit players from product endorsement compensation,202 but it
would be wise to remove this restriction for two reasons. First, the money
paid to the student athletes would flow from third parties instead of the university, thus relieving the university of any financial burden, and second, it
would eliminate Title IX issues.
The two O’Bannon remedies satisfactorily balance the troubling notion
of colleges unjustly profiting off a student athlete’s likeness to their exclusion while also limiting runaway spending. Although the O’Bannon remedies are limited to college men’s football and basketball student athletes,
those are the only two revenue-generating programs at most universities.203

Id. at 971–72, 1008. Essentially, this remedy allows universities to provide stipends to “top off”
the difference between grant-in-aid scholarships and the true cost of attendance. Id. at 982–83.
196. Keeping in mind the NCAA’s sacred goal of competitive balance, the court allowed the
NCAA to cap the scholarship compensation amount under this scheme, as long as the cap is above
that university’s cost of attendance. Id. at 1008. This cap would prevent the smaller schools from
losing a financial arms race to bigger and richer universities in attracting recruits.
197. Id. Note that the fund is payable upon leaving the university and does not necessarily
require graduation. Id. at 982.
198. Id.
199. Id. Moreover, each player on the same team must receive the same amount each year.
Id.
200. Id. Note that the O’Bannon remedies apply to all D1 FBS men’s basketball and football
student athletes, whereas the NWU Board case narrowly involved scholarship football student athletes at Northwestern University.
201. Id. at 984.
202. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 12.5.2.1 (2009–2010).
203. See Kristi A. Dosh, Latest NCAA Report Shows Gap Between Haves and Have-Nots, FOX
SPORTS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/outkick-the-coverage/latestncaa-report-shows-gap-between-haves-and-have-nots-082014#fb-root (“Football and men’s basketball continue to be the two sports athletic departments have to rely upon to drive the department’s revenue.”).
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The revenue producing programs subsidize the dozens of other expensive
sports programs that D1 universities offer. 204 What is more, only 7 of the
230 public D1 universities did not subsidize their athletic department’s
budget with student fees, institutional, and state support in 2013. 205
Early signs indicate that the O’Bannon remedies are receiving support.
University of Texas Athletic Director Steve Patterson has already embraced
the O’Bannon ruling. 206 Patterson announced that if O’Bannon is upheld on
appeal, the university would spend six million dollars per year investing in
both the cost-of-attendance stipend and trust fund remedy. 207 This announcement encouragingly shows that universities are willing to implement
the voluntary O’Bannon remedies to more student athlete teams than were
even involved in the case. 208 As universities like Texas offer recruits these
incentives, other universities will likely follow suit to remain competitive,
thus increasing overall benefits.
Indeed, O’Bannon’s cost-of-attendance goal saw progress before the
case reached the court of appeals. At an annual meeting in January 2015,209

204. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *13 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 (“In addition, the profit realized from the football team’s
annual revenue is utilized to subsidize the Employer’s non-revenue generating sports (that is, all
the other varsity sports with the exception of men’s basketball).”).
TODAY
(June
4,
2014),
205. College
Sports
Finances
Chart,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/10/college-athletic-department-revenuedatabase-methodology/2150123/. Since the NCAA does not release this type of data, the only
data available is for public universities. Nor is the NCAA retaining an exorbitant amount of revenue, as it redistributes over ninety percent of revenue back to the universities. Simon & Hatch,
supra note 166. Recall that universities already provide scholarship student athletes with an immensely valuable free education. See, e.g., NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *3 (SA’s four-year
scholarship value is $244,000). Any time a call is made for increased student athlete benefits, one
should cautiously consider how much the athletic-related expenses would siphon funds from academic expenses, harming the university’s primary purpose.
206. Michael A. Lindenberger, Texas Athletic Director: With New Rules, Longhorns Would
MORNING
NEWS
(Oct.
21,
2014),
Pay
Each
Player
$10,000,
DALLAS
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/headlines/20141021-texas-athletic-directorwith-new-rules-longhorns-will-pay-each-player-10000.ece.
207. Id. The university would provide $10,000 total to each male and female student athlete,
$5,000 to cover expenses not covered by the traditional grant-in-aid scholarships and $5,000 for
the likeness trust fund. John Taylor, Texas Could Pay Student-Athletes 10K Annually, NBC
SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/22/texas-to-pay-studentathletes-10k-annually/.
208. Recall that O’Bannon was a class action lawsuit only on behalf of former men’s basketball and football players.
209. The NCAA D1 Board of Directors recently voted 16–2 to allow the Power Five conferences greater autonomy in dealing with student athlete “welfare” issues so that they can change
rules without NCAA approval or involving the 75 non-Power Five member universities. Brian
Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-fivepower-conferences.
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the “Power Five” 210 conferences voted 79–1 211 in favor of allowing Power
Five member universities to voluntarily expand scholarship maximums
from grant-in-aid to that of the cost-of-attendance. 212 The Power Five also
narrowly voted in favor of legislation that precludes universities from not
renewing a student athlete’s scholarship for athletic reasons. 213 Encouraging signals from the University of Texas and Power Five conferences hint
that the O’Bannon appeals court may end up codifying the status quo more
than it initially foresaw.
2. Universities Should Put the Student Back in Student Athlete
(Emphasis Needed)
Second, the NCAA needs to enact reform to give student athletes the
proper educational focus that a university student expects and deserves.
Front and center on the NCAA homepage, a textbox reads, “Student-athlete
success on the field, in the classroom, and in life is at the heart of our mission.” 214 If the NCAA and its members truly believe that, they need to do
more to show that the label “student athlete” is more than an empty catchphrase. Unlike the Board or any state legislature, the NCAA has exclusive
authority to efficiently and effectively institute the type of reforms that
would reaffirm education as the primary goal of each NCAA member university. Contrary to the website’s claim, a cursory glance of news headlines
reveals that the problem of universities failing to satisfactorily educate student athletes is widespread and long-standing. 215 To fix this problem, the
210. The Power Five conferences consist of the ACC, Big-10, Big-12, Pac-12, and SEC (plus
the University of Notre Dame). Id.
211. The 65 Power Five member universities each get one vote and each of the five conferences gets three votes. Boston College cast the lone dissenting vote and released a statement expressing concern at increasing expenses spent on student athletes at the detriment of allocating
resources for need-based students in the general student body. Michael Sullivan, BC Athletics
Votes Alone in Dissent of Full Cost of Attendance Scholarship Measure, BC HEIGHTS (Jan. 18,
2015),
http://bcheights.com/news/2015/bc-athletics-votes-alone-dissent-full-cost-attendancescholarship-measure/.
212. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarship in Historic Vote, USA TODAY
(Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-costof-attendance-student-athletes-scholarships/21921073/. The new rules resulting from the vote go
into effect August 1, 2015. Id. For discussion of the “cost-of-attendance” vs. “grant-in-aid”
scholarship value see supra note 195.
213. Berkowitz, supra note 212.
214. NCAA HOMEPAGE, http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
215. In the decade of the 2000s alone, the NCAA punished 15 of the 120 FBS universities for
“serious” academic fraud violations. Doug Lederman, Half of Big-Time NCAA Programs Had
TODAY
(Feb.
7,
2011),
Major
Violations,
USA
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-02-07-ncaa-infractions_N.htm. As a more
specific example, only forty-four percent of men’s basketball players at leading programs graduate
within six years. Justice for Jocks, ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2014, at 12, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21612156-americas-exploitative-college-sports-systemcan-be-mended-not-ended-justice-jocks.
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NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the time student athletes expend on sports, guarantee scholarships until graduation, improve medical
care coverage, and reform education and admissions standards to ensure
that student athletes are being properly educated at the right institution.
The NCAA should expand its authority to regulate the amount of time
that student athletes can devote to athletic-related activities. 216 By expanding the definition of regulated athletic activities, the NCAA could reduce
the maximum weekly hours spent on sports and provide student athletes
more time to focus on their studies. The NCAA would then have increased
powers to sanction offending universities that stretch the rules and overwork players. Notably, this change would have no adverse effect on competitive balance among the teams, because each team would equally spend
less time practicing.
There are two simple but demonstrative financial steps the NCAA and
its member universities should take to reinforce their commitment to academics over athletics. The first step is to guarantee each student athlete
their scholarship until they graduate, 217 like some conferences and universities have already done. 218 This action would prevent a student from losing
his scholarship due to an athletic injury. 219 Second, the NCAA should
compel universities to pay for all sports-related medical bills.220 The
NCAA can prove it is serious about academics by implementing these steps
so that student athletes can focus on what is important in the classroom
216. Current NCAA bylaws mandate that when student athletes are “in-season,” they cannot
engage in countable athletically related activities (“CARAs,” defined as “any required activity
with an athletics purpose involving student-athletes and at the direction of, or supervised by one or
more of an institution’s coaching staff”) exceeding four hours per day and twenty hours per week.
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 17.02.1, 17.1.6.1 (2009–2010). Testimony from the NWU case
revealed SAs spent forty to fifty hours per week on football during the season, since they did not
all count as CARAs. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, at *6 (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359. These activities include “voluntary” (in
name only) drills nominally organized by the quarterback, time spent traveling to games, medical
check-ins, and mandatory training meetings. Id. at 6 n.11. If the NCAA expanded § 17.02.1 to
include all of these activities and actually enforced the twenty hour per week limit, or better yet
lowered it, student athletes would have sufficient time to focus on their studies like their nonathlete peers. By encompassing more activities under CARA, the competitive balance would likely become more fair, since teams could no longer easily engage in activities outside CARA.
217. Any scholarship guarantee should still be subject to violating NCAA/university rules of
conduct or voluntary withdrawal.
218. See Strauss, supra note 177 (discussing reforms to the PAC-12 and Big-10 Conferences);
see also NWU, Case 13-RC-121359 at *15 (discussing NWU’s guarantee of four-year scholarships). Many universities, however, still renew scholarships for student athletes on a yearly basis.
Id.
219. E.g., Brian Montopoli, Kevin Ware Injury Could Put Scholarship at Risk, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/kevin-ware-injury-could-put-scholarship-at-risk/.
220. The NCAA insurance deductible for catastrophic injuries is $90,000, leaving many student athletes unable to pay their medical bills for injuries sustained in the course of athletic play.
E.g., Kristina Peterson, College Athletes Stuck with the Bill After Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/sports/16athletes.html?_r=0.
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without being burdened by financial risks stemming from their athletic participation.
Perhaps the biggest challenge in overhauling the current system is to
make universities treat academic progression as a reality and not just an obstacle. A recent report detailed a troublingly apathetic academic system at
UNC where professors, advisors, coaches, associate deans, and other officials conspired to cheat thousands of student athletes out of a true education
by skating them through fake classes and allowing artificial grades for over
two decades, just to keep them eligible for competition. 221 The amount of
university officials complicit in academic fraud scandals violates the pillars
of intellectual growth and integrity on which institutions of higher learning
stand. Scholars maintain that a university has a fiduciary duty to its students, a duty of care and loyalty to use good faith in selflessly providing
them an exceptional education.222 Unfortunately, universities often fail to
make good on this duty to student athletes.
To remedy this systemic corruption, NCAA sanctions need to be severe enough to make offending universities never contemplate fraud again
while deterring other universities from speculating about the probable value
of skirting rules to maintain player eligibility. The NCAA also must create
an independent oversight body to monitor academic fraud and abandon its
current practice of allowing the universities themselves to self-report aca-

221. Sara Ganim & Devon M. Sayers, UNC Report Finds 18 Years of Academic Fraud to
Keep Athletes Playing, CNN (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/unc-reportacademic-fraud. A similar scandal recently occurred at Florida State University. Lynn Zinser,
N.C.A.A. Penalizes Florida State for Academic Fraud, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/sports/ncaafootball/07ncaa.html?_r=0 (involving a situation
where academic advisors, tutors, and learning specialists provided sixty student athletes with exam answers, typed portions of papers, and took tests in their place). These examples are just the
recently emerged tip of the iceberg. See Lederman, supra note 215 (discussing that serious violations of academic rules at FBS universities doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s). Universities
face serious pressure to win and serious consequences for losing, so when one college engages in
academic fraud to keep its players eligible, other schools feel pressured to do the same. ANDREW
A. ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS 4 (1999) (“And when one [NCAA] school cheats, others feel compelled to do the same.”).
222. See, e.g., Richard Salgado, Educating Someone Who Can’t or Doesn’t Want to Be Educated: The Shifting Fiduciary Duty Continuum of Big-Time College Sports, 3 WILLAMETTE
SPORTS L.J. 27, 29 (2006) (noting that some commentators have recently suggested a fiduciary
duty exists in a university setting); Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework
for Understanding and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J.
159, 160, 163 (2005) (stating that historically, the student-teacher relationship has been viewed as
a fiduciary one); Kent Weeks and Rich Hagland, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153, 154–55 (2002) (discussing the applicability of fiduciary relationships to the student-teacher relationship). But see Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d
410, 415 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting student athlete’s claim that the university committed educational malpractice by failing to provide a meaningful education).

2015]

VARSITY BLUES

617

demic fraud, 223 which merely leads to obvious conflicting interests and facilitates underreporting. 224
The NCAA can address one root of the academic fraud problem by being tougher on admission standards for student athletes. The NCAA should
reform admissions standards by enforcing SAT percentile ranges that all
admitted student athletes must fall between, consistent with that university’s student body. The effect of this policy would be that students unqualified to meet the rigors of a particular university would not be set up to fail
by being in over their head in their studies.225 If a student athlete cannot
keep up with his or her studies, it would be wiser to quit the voluntary sport
and focus on education. Need-based and merit scholarships are available to
all students; athletics is not the only means of obtaining a scholarship.
Ninety-eight percent of the student athletes discussed in this Comment will
not play sports professionally, so it might benefit more students-athletes in
the long-term if they realized they should not be playing sports collegiately
either—and instead focus on earning a degree that will carry them to a successful career.
In the long term, student athletes would be worse off by drifting even
further toward the economic and employment dimension; instead, they
would benefit from being reined back toward the academic and educational
aspect of attending university. A degree and a quality education will take
them much further in life than a few years of enjoying the benefits of being
an “employee” while playing a sport that 98.5% of them will never play
professionally. These individuals are not employees, they are students, and
they need to be treated primarily as such. A scholarship saxophone player
at a university is unlikely to become a professional in an orchestra and
therefore needs a strong education so she can succeed at becoming an engineer, a lawyer, or a teacher—and student athletes deserve the same.
Some might criticize the above remedies and argue that the NCAA
would never unilaterally impose these degrees of sanctions and reforms.
The recent Power Five rule changes provide a strong example of why this
criticism is misguided. Just last year, one student athlete complained on national television of having to go hungry certain days because he could not

223. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 2.8.1 (2009–2010).
224. Stephan A. Miller, The NCAA Needs to Let Someone Else Enforces Its Rules, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/10/the-ncaa-needs-to-letsomeone-else-enforce-its-rules/264012/?single_page=true.
225. If a student is not qualified to attend the particular university, it will do more harm than
good to force him through for eligibility reasons. Professors, advisors, deans, and tutors should all
have the ultimate goal of furthering the student athletes’ educational development. That is the
core purpose of a university.
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afford food. 226 Within a month, the NCAA released new rules guaranteeing
unlimited meals and snacks to all student athletes.227 The recent O’Bannon
and NWU cases prompted the aforementioned conferences and universities
to guarantee four-year scholarships to all athletes, and other universities
may follow suit by paying for all sports-related medical costs. 228 Early in
the 2014 season, the NFL (also an oft-criticized body) unilaterally changed
its suspension policies, both for drugs and for domestic violence, due to
public pressure. 229 With the continuing pressure mounted against the
NCAA and member universities through court cases, scandals, the media,
and public outcry, these types of reforms are realistic. 230
E. Future Outlook for Collegiate Athletics
There are several student athlete related cases to watch with significant
implications on the current model of intercollegiate athletics, including in
the state of Maryland. 231
1. The NWU Unionization NLRB Case
Decisions that will be made in the immediate future may have potentially game changing effects on collegiate athletics reform and the power
held by student athletes. Whether the Board affirms or reverses the RD’s
decision, 232 its decision may be appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, where the Chevron judicial standard of review for administrative
decisions becomes an important factor.
There are two steps to Chevron judicial review: (1) whether Congress
in the statute has directly spoken to the issue (if so, that is the end of the
226. Soraya Nadia McDonald, National Champ U-Conn.’s Napier Says He Goes to Bed Starving, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/04/08/national-champ-uconns-napier-says-he-goes-to-bed-starving/.
227. Hosick, supra note 179.
228. See Jessica Bartlett, City Council Weighs Mandating Insurance for Life for Injured College Athletes, BOSTON BUS. J. (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/healthcare/2014/10/city-council-weighs-mandating-insurance-for-life.html?page=all (proposed city
council ordinance would require all universities in the city of Boston to cover student athlete injuries sustained during play for life).
229. Ben Volin, NFL Makes Changes to Rules and Procedures, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 21,
2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2014/09/20/nfl-makes-changes-rules-andprocedures/buxXKk5iDGf0VybjRbuzdL/story.html.
230. Frank Fear, Public Pressure Ignites NCAA Sports Reform, SPORTS COLUMN (July 16,
2014), http://www.thesportscol.com/2014/07/public-pressure-ignites-ncaa-sports-reform/.
231. Student athlete unionization and reforming collegiate athletics are important both nationally and in Maryland, home to the University of Maryland, College Park, a new member of the
Big-10, of which NWU is a member. As a regular opponent, any changes to the standards and
rules that a unionized NWU team achieves would directly affect the competitive balance in competing against Maryland, a public university outside the Board’s jurisdiction.
232. NWU, Case 13-RC-121359, (N.L.R.B. Region 13 Mar. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 (finding the SAs were employees under the Act).
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matter), and if not, (2) whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible
construction of the relevant statute. 233 The first “plain meaning” step can be
surpassed if the statute is ambiguous or if Congress implicitly or explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill using its expertise.234 The second Chevron
step assesses whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, which is a
highly deferential review standard rooted in the idea that Congress entrusted the agencies to resolve these types of issues with their expertise and
knowledge. 235
As long as the agency interpretation is reasonable, it is likely that the
Board’s decision on appeal would stand. Typically, if the agency can get to
step two, “the agency almost always wins.” 236 If the Board upholds the
RD’s decision that the student athletes are employees however, the enormous (and adverse) impact of such a decision may make a reviewing court
take pause at this traditionally deferential second step.
2. The O’Bannon v. NCAA Antitrust Case
The second important development going forward will be the resolution of O’Bannon. If the remedies raising the value of scholarships and
creating trust funds are upheld, they will greatly benefit college men’s football and basketball players, but perhaps (due to Title IX financial obligations) at the expense of the vast majority of other male student athletes.
Regardless, allowing some student athletes to benefit financially from their
image or likeness through a trust fund will remedy the discomforting sense
of unfairness while also maintaining their amateur status while enrolled.
III. CONCLUSION
The fairness of collegiate athletics is deservedly under scrutiny and the
NCAA and its member universities are under legal and public pressure to
reform the broken system. The SAs’ unwise strategy of seeking reform
through unionization and collective bargaining rights conflicts with governing precedent 237 and ultimately harms the long-term goals of universities
and their students: to receive a valuable education.238 By wrongfully ap233. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
234. Id. at 843–44. It is permissible for courts to look at legislative history and intent at this
step, so there is a possibility the court could find the statute’s purpose did not intend for student
athletes to be employees. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–
33 (2000) (using statutory construction (including legislative history) to halt Chevron review at
step one). More likely, a reviewing court would read Section 2(3)’s definition of “employee” to
be either an intentional definition gap or sufficiently ambiguous to proceed to step two.
235. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45.
236. Richard M. Cooper, Challenging Food and Drug Administration Interpretations of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2003).
237. See supra Part II.A
238. See supra Part II.B.
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proving the SAs’ petition, the RD thrust the Board into a no-win situation
where its limited jurisdiction to create reform will further complicate the
matter and exacerbate the unfairness in collegiate athletics. 239 On appeal,
the Board should reverse the RD’s decision and rule that student athletes
are not employees of their universities, or should alternatively exercise its
discretion to decline jurisdiction and vacate the RD’s decision.
Instead of unions or the Board inserting themselves into the issue, the
NCAA is the proper body to remedy the current situation.240 With the influence of courts, public opinion, and universities themselves, the NCAA
should initiate reforms to address student athlete exploitation and the disdainful college “education” through which some student athletes are shepherded. Keeping in mind that hardly any student athletes will play professionally, the NCAA should rein back athletic time commitments so that
students can appropriately focus on success in the classroom that will benefit them for the remainder of their lives. Rediscovering the student in student athlete will realize the true purpose for which institutions of higher
learning exist.
The future of collegiate athletics looks more uncertain than ever.241 If
the Board mistakenly upholds the RD’s NWU decision, collegiate athletics
will evolve into a two-tiered hierarchy, with unionized-employee student
athletes who increasingly receive benefits that pull them away from education into the economic realm of employment at the top level. Below that, a
second tier of all other student athletes will emerge whose existence will be
increasingly eroded as financial resources transition to the employed athletes due to collective bargaining. O’Bannon, if upheld, will only affect
revenue-generating athletes at the top schools, but if more fully embraced,
will provide student athletes with a valuable trust fund upon graduation
with which to begin their careers and invest in their future.
Those that see collegiate sports purely as a “moneybag” (a category
that must include some university, NCAA, and now union officials) have
stretched the rubber band encircling higher education to its breaking point.
If student athletes are deemed employees, the band will snap, releasing
them into the land of labor and employment, destined to become just a line
on a balance sheet. The tension must be relaxed, allowing student athletes
to return their focus to education, lest we forget the true meaning and purpose of being a university student.

239. See supra Part II.C.
240. See supra Part II.D.
241. See supra Part II.E.

